Which decision is ethical? The acts/omissions doctrine, in conceiving of acts and omissions to act as ethically unequal, would support the decision of non-interference: for whom has the bystander harmed by letting the trolley take its course? This is obviously a doctrine of free will. In other words, it was not the will of the bystander that the trolley be a runaway trolley, therefore it is not his or her fault when it kills the five people; nor is it the bystander’s responsibility to save the five by killing the one. From the perspective of determinism however – still under the assumption that the death of five people is worse than the death of one – the impulse to interfere is just as fateful as the runaway trolley itself, therefore the ability to act obliges the bystander to interfere. A deterministic ethics does not conceive of acts and omissions as unequal. Hence it perceives not interfering as an unethical act in itself.
The essential dilemma of the trolley problem is then free will versus determinism, which is a metaphysical problem. With the inability to discern whether the universe is freewill or deterministic, or even the conclusion that it is governed equally by both free will and determinism, comes the inability to decide ethically between non-interference and interference. If the universe is governed by free will alone, then the trolley is not the bystander’s responsibility, and thus interfering would be unethical. If the universe is governed by determinism alone, then the trolley is the bystander’s responsibility, and interfering would be ethical. The principle of double effect arises within these considerations due to the fact of either decision resulting in an effect which is both good and bad, which is to say, in both cases someone lives and someone dies.
But what if we were to remove the assumptions of the trolley problem, the first being that five people are better than one person, and the second being that the people on the tracks are strangers [the third assumption, which will be omitted here due to its instinctual character and undeniable significance for our survival, is that death is bad and life is good], what decisions regarding interference and non-interference would result?
Let us say that the people on the left, who will be killed if we do not interfere, are a racist mob, and the person on the right, who will survive if we do not interfere, is Albert Einstein. Being that the one in this case is generally considered to be good, whereas the five are considered to be evil, the obvious decision arrived at (nearly without thought) is non-interference. Who cares if the trolley kills a racist mob? The answer is: virtually no one. Let us now say that the people on the left are a team of cancer-curing scientists, and the person on the right is Adolf Hitler. All of a sudden not interfering becomes unethical, and we decide to save the five and kill the one. But have we not murdered Hitler if we do this? And are we not just as much murderers as we would claim him to be (that supposed evidence of his evil)? The same holds for the previous scenario: is it an act of murder to let the racist mob die by not interfering (only because we do not wish to kill Einstein)? We will not attempt to answer these questions yet, but will only acknowledge that in the first instance – of interference being unethical – as in the second – of it being ethical – there are preexistent ethical judgments: i.e. that racist mobs and Hitler are evil, and that cancer-curing scientists and Einstein are good. Only on the basis of these preexistent judgments can the decision to interfere with the trolley become so unproblematic.
Let us now say that on the left are strangers, and on the right is a family member: it is obvious that non-interference is the ethical decision. Conversely, if on the left are family members and on the right is a stranger, we obviously interfere to save our family. But in the first case it is conceivable that we have murdered strangers, and in the second case that we have murdered a stranger. Moreover, what if on the left is myself, and I have the ability to divert the trolley (which will save me, but kill a stranger in the right fork)? Is this not the instinct of self-preservation? Am I not merely surviving in this scenario? And finally, what if on the left is my family and on the right is myself, and I have the ability to divert the trolley (which will save my family, but will kill me in the process)? Is this not the instinct of self-sacrifice? Am I not merely allowing my family to survive? Considering all of these instances, it is clear that neither interference nor non-interference is absolutely classifiable as ethical or unethical. The decision in each case is dependent upon some preexistent judgment, which makes its ethicality obvious. It is not that the strangers in these examples are evil, but that family members are always valued higher than strangers (this is a judgment based solely on instinct). Neither is it that the stranger opposite me is evil, but that I am driven by instinct to value myself higher than he or she. With instinct as our basis then, we can say that any solution to the trolley problem which involves familial and/or self-preservation is ethical.
But now we must return to our unanswered questions. It appears that the judgment of Hitler being evil is based solely on his detriment to humankind (his murdering many); and similarly, that the judgment of Einstein being good is based solely on his contribution to humankind (his benefiting many). These judgments taken together seem to suggest an ethics based upon the many, do they not? The same is the case with the racist mob (which murders many and is ergo evil) and the cancer-curing scientists (which benefit many and are ergo good).
It is obvious in the cases of familial and self preservation that the number of people on either track is inconsequential. But if we are to solve the trolley problem by judging its track’s inhabitants based on how they are beneficial (or detrimental) to many, it is obviously not inconsequential that on the left there are five and on the right there is one. To state this more precisely: if we judge Hitler evil because of his detriment to many, we must also interfere with the trolley in order that the racist mob (the many) survives in lieu of Einstein. An ethics that judges Hitler evil and Einstein good always operates with the unstated assumption that five people are better than one.
However, only a very superficial reading of the situation will result in this contradiction. For if we consider in the future how many people Hitler will be the detriment of, by killing him we benefit them. Likewise, if we consider in the future how many people the racist mob will be the detriment of, by letting them die we benefit those many. But what the acts/omissions distinction deals with is whether killing Hitler by interfering and letting die the racist mob by not interfering are both characterizable as murders. Does the ethicality of each action rest upon the intention of our decision? For instance, if the bystander’s intention is to let Einstein live, and therefore unintentionally (by not interfering) kills the racist mob, is such non-interference ethical? Conversely, if the bystander’s intention is to kill Hitler, and therefore unintentionally (by interfering) lets the cancer-curing scientists live, is such interference unethical? In other words, is intention a viable basis for ethicality? If we agree that it is, then not interfering to let Einstein live is ethical, although the racist mob dies; whereas not interfering to let the racist mob die is unethical, although Einstein lives. Not only are the outcomes of the two intentions identical, but the action which executes the intentions – that of not altering the trolley’s path – is one and the same action. Proving the bystander’s intention, therefore, is impossible; although in a Christian universe God would assuredly know it.
Notwithstanding all of intention’s elusiveness, there emerges an undeniable hierarchy of value which we place upon different people within the trolley problem. The first (whom we value most) are our families; any time they are on the track we choose their lives instinctually. The second are ourselves, who we would only sacrifice for our families. The third are the good, the fourth are the strangers (good or evil), and the last are the evil. Those valued higher will always be chosen over those lower. And if, for instance, there are five Einsteins on the left and one Einstein on the right, to interfere is ethical; but if there are five Hitlers on the left and one on the right, then to not interfere becomes ethical. In light of these examples it is clear that the quantity of humans is no indicator whatsoever of their quality. And only if we have knowledge of their quality can we make a rational judgment regarding whether or not to interfere with the trolley.
But given that we are ignorant of those on the tracks: by not interfering we may unintentionally let cancer-curing scientists die and a racist dictator live, or by interfering we may unintentionally save a racist mob and kill a brilliant scientist. It is clear that fate has caused the trolley to barrel out of control, but it is also clear that fate has placed us in a position with the ability to interfere. Now, we can interpret this as coincidental (and not interfere), or we can interpret this as destined (and interfere), or we can interpret it to be both (and stand indecisive for a moment). But in the end we have to choose, do we not? We either walk away or divert the trolley. We cannot do neither. I would say that since fate has brought us to the situation, we should flip a coin and let fate retain control of the situation: heads we do not interfere, tails we interfere.