God is something than which nothing greater can be conceived. God then exists in the understanding, since we understand this concept. But if He only existed in the understanding, something greater could be conceived, for a being that exists in reality is greater than one that exists only in the understanding. But then we can conceive of something greater than that than which nothing greater can be conceived, which is contradictory. Hence, God cannot exist only in the understanding, but also exists in reality.Is this argument sound? Does it prove the existence of God? Seemingly it does. The only apparent weaknesses in it are the characterization of God as ‘something’ [obviously if God did exist then God’s existence would transcend that of merely being a thing (since God is supposedly the supreme being)] and the adjective ‘greater,’ which may inadvertently introduce an element of subjectivism. But if we clarify the meaning of ‘something’ and ‘greater’ perhaps the argument will be strengthened.
What does Anselm mean by ‘something than which nothing greater can be conceived’? If we conceive of every phenomenon present in every space at every time, and conceive of something greater than this, it can only be spatiotemporal omnipresence. What characterizes ‘presence’ is being in a particular space at a particular time, whereas omnipresence is characterized as being in all spaces at all times. Omnipresence is that of which no greater spatiotemporality can be conceived. While we cannot comprehend that which is omnipresent [for comprehension only functions in the realm of presences], we can comprehend that for the omnipresent to be incomprehensible, it must first of all be. The being – or existence – of this entity is thus substantiated by its incomprehensibility. As Kierkegaard says, “...how deceptive then, that an omnipresent being should be recognizable precisely by being invisible, only and alone recognizable by this trait, since his visibility would annul his omnipresence.” Science’s belief in a ‘Cosmos’ (a universe which exhibits interconnectedness and order) is no different from the belief in a spatiotemporally omnipresent entity: viz., a deity.
Thus with minimal semantic clarification, Anselm’s argument can be shown to be sound. However, there was a monk in his time, Guanilo of Marmoutiers, who formulated a notable refutation to the argument. Guanilo’s refutation consists in the assertion that Anselm’s pattern of reasoning could be utilized to prove the existence of a perfect island. Let us test his assertion, referring to the island as Avalon:
Avalon is the island of which none more perfect can be conceived. Avalon then exists in the understanding, since we understand this concept. But if it only existed in the understanding, an island more perfect could be conceived, for a perfect island existing in reality is more perfect than one existing only in the understanding. But then we can conceive of an island more perfect than the island of which none more perfect can be conceived, which is contradictory. Hence, Avalon cannot only exist in the understanding, but also exists in reality.The adjective ‘perfect’ obviously weakens this refutation (for it is a purely aesthetic term, viz. it is inescapably subjective). Meaning that Avalon cannot actually exist in the understanding because there can be no valid concept of perfection. For instance: is the perfect island’s perfection such because it contains certain numbers of certain species of tree? Is it perfect because only a certain number of mammals inhabit it? Is it devoid of insects? Is it x kilometers from the nearest mainland, at y latitude and z longitude?
Perfection is obviously indefinable. The second weakness of his refutation is the fact that God is – by definition – greater than Avalon. Comparing Avalon to God is like comparing a water molecule to the ocean. Guanilo’s refutation is hence invalid (however intriguing). But although Guanilo’s refutation is unsound, his concept of the perfect island is utilizable. If we were to name the universe Avalon, and therewith conceive of it as an island of existence in a sea of nonexistence, its character as self-limiting – which is to say, its character of being limited by nothing – becomes conceivable (at least in words). How an Avalon universe derives existence from nonexistence – or as the Taoists would say, how Being is born of non-being [Daodejing 40] – is precisely that which is ungraspable of it. Moreover, does there exist a cosmological hypothesis which coheres to the Avalon universe more so than the others?
For instance there is the open universe, which expands forever, the closed universe, which will eventually collapse into itself, and the phoenix universe, which expands then collapses then expands then collapses. Recent observations (1998) suggest that the universe’s expansion rate is accelerating, which seems to support the open universe hypothesis. Being that neither the closed nor the phoenix hypotheses seem to cohere to the Avalon universe any more than does the open hypothesis, for now we must conclude – in accordance with observation and linguistic conceivability – that we live in an open-Avalon universe.
Addendum (2017): apparently when I wrote this essay I believed, or at least wanted to believe, that Anselm’s argument was sound. However, rereading it now – and having become far more acquainted with Kierkegaard’s thoughts on the matter – I do not perceive the argument [or any supposed proof of God’s existence] as valid. What characterizes a God-relationship is not such that it can be achieved by logical deduction, mathematical proof, or by the endless accumulation of scientific data. Alternately, only Kierkegaard’s leap of faith or something like it can bring one to this achievement. Even so, I am unsure whether I am the type of person who can make such a leap. Perhaps not everyone is meant to be as religious as Kierkegaard wanted to be.